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Introduction: aims and scope
The Ambaca railway was one of  Portugal’s first undertakings in its colo-
nial territories in Africa. To build and operate it, the Portuguese government 
relied on a public-private partnership with British investors, similarly to oth-
er lines operated on the mainland. The deal should have benefitted the par-
ties involved, but it soon became a source of  problems for all. In this paper, I 
will analyse this railway line as a case study of  the relationship between state 
and private initiatives in the specific context of  the colonization of  Africa. 
The inception of  the Ambaca line can be traced back to the early 1850s, 
when Portugal initiated an ambitious public works programme, based on the 
Saint-Simonianist ideas of  circulation, industrialisation and progress, where 
railways played a decisive role.1 From the late 1870s onwards, that agenda was 
transferred to the Portuguese overseas colonies in Africa and Asia.2 The Am-
baca railway was one of  the first Portuguese investments in Africa. 
The line’s history is well known, since the seminal article of  Guimarães 
and especially since the doctoral dissertation of  Navarro. Both provide the 
bulk of  qualitative information about the Ambaca line mentioned in this pa-
per. The railway project had been thought about since the 1840s, as a tool to 
exploit the resources of  the Angolan hinterland and to ascertain Portuguese 
* This research was funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology, Portugal (post-doc-
toral fellowship SFRH/BPD/95212/2013 and legal umbrella provided by decree-law 57/2016 and law 
57/2017), through CIUHCT (UID/HIS/00286).
1. Saraiva (2007), pp. 264-266.
2. Alexandre and Dias (1998), pp. 156-159.
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presence in Angola. Up until the 1870s some proposals for its construction 
presented by different entrepreneurs were accepted with no practical conse-
quences. In 1885, the Portuguese minister of  Marinha e Ultramar [Colonies], 
Mr Pinheiro Chagas, pressured by the outcomings of  the Berlin Conference 
(which to a large extent were unfavourable to the Portuguese presence in Af-
rica), hired Portuguese businessman Alexandre Peres to build and operate the 
line between Luanda and Ambaca. The contract stipulated that a private 
company founded by Mr Peres could operate the line for 99 years, benefiting 
from a guarantee of  yield of  6% from the state. In 1886, Mr Peres and his as-
sociates created the Companhia Real dos Caminhos de Ferro Através de África 
[Royal Company of  Railways Across Africa], and found financial support in 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and mainly in Britain,3 and began the construc-
tion. The deadline was four years, but it took almost thirteen before the rail-
way could be inaugurated in its full extension in 1899. The construction cost 
more than anticipated, and operation revenues fell far short of  expectations. 
Consequently, the company struggled with financial difficulties. The spectre 
of  default and British investors foreclosing on the line (thus depriving Portu-
gal of  a crucial empire-building tool in a highly disputed region) was con-
stantly present. To prevent this, successive Portuguese governments (encom-
passing three different regimes: monarchy until 1910, republic until 1926, and 
then dictatorship) granted different kinds of support to the company, which 
blamed the government for its dire financial situation. Conflict escalated un-
til the company was nationalized and liquidated in 1938. In Angola, the im-
pact of  the railway on the economy was barely relevant.4
In this paper, I build upon this knowledge and add quantitative data (op-
erational statistics, financing, state aid, and debt) to the history of  the Am-
baca railway. I also consider the evolution of  the Portuguese financial system 
and the diplomatic context of  the European presence in Africa. I focus on the 
period between 1886 and 1914, when the Royal Company created a financial 
situation that became unsustainable with the war and the currency devalua-
tion of  the 1920s. Also, for this period, sources are available and abundant, 
but they become scarcer and discontinuous from the war years onwards. 
I will illustrate the evolution of  the partnership, and how the state was 
called upon to cover the losses of  private initiative. It is not my intention to 
conduct an historical trial to determine who in this process was right and who 
was wrong; my goal is to understand more clearly the contours of  the pub-
lic-private partnership of  Ambaca from a business history perspective, and to 
3. Biblioteca do Banco de Portugal, Relatório do Conselho d’Administração e Parecer do 
Conselho Fiscal da Companhia dos Caminhos de Ferro Atravez d’Africa [henceforth, Royal Com-
pany Annual Report], 1918-1919, p. 45.
4. Guimarães (1983). Navarro (2018), pp. 257-313. 
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add to the debate about the relationship between government and private en-
terprise in the specific context of  the scramble for Africa and the New Impe-
rialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.5 
Overview of public-private partnerships in the railway sector in Europe 
and Portugal in the second half of the nineteenth century
Different nations of  Continental Europe (France, Belgium, Spain, Swe-
den, Denmark, Norway) followed the Saint-Simonianist belief  that the state, 
advised by a technocratic elite, should play a substantial role in the construc-
tion and operation of capital-intensive infrastructures, like railway networks.6 
From the very first moment, statesmen from those countries understood that 
governmental intervention/regulation at different levels was indispensable to 
amending the limitations and disadvantages of  natural monopolies, such as 
those in the railway sector.7 
When it came to the construction and operation of  railways, state inter-
vention could take on two forms: direct administration (the state was more 
intrusive and its engineers took the responsibility of  laying down and man-
aging the lines); or strategic partnerships with private companies that built 
and/or operated the railroads, under a set of  guidelines and benefiting from 
a diversified array of  incentives (more in line with the liberal ideology of  the 
epoch, private enterprises took the leading role).8 
In the latter case, an intuitu personae (literally, “because of  the person”) 
concession contract was usually signed. By this agreement, the state granted 
a private firm, during a predetermined period, an infrastructure that belonged 
to public domain.9 The private entity could operate that infrastructure seek-
ing profit. Additionally, it could benefit from a public contribution if  it was 
considered that the net revenues were not enough to pay the investment.10 
Usually, that contribution took the form of a guarantee of  yield, which could 
be highly beneficial or highly damaging to the Treasury, depending on the net 
 5. The period of colonial expansion during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
characterized by heavy investment in science and technology and the self-imposition of civilizing 
missions in Africa and Asia. Headrick (1981). Pakenham (2003).
 6. Gramlich (1994), p. 1177.
 7. Through contracts, taxes, fares, financial intervention (raising capital through state loans 
or taxes), supervision or operational support (sundry allowances, fiscal exemptions, guarantees of 
yield). See: Andersson-Skog (2000), pp. 30, 34-35 and 37. Cuéllar (2018), p. 557. Ortúñez (2015), 
p. 130.
 8. Justino (2016), p. 32. Ortúñez (2009), pp. 142-143. Ortúñez (2014), p. 109. Ortúñez (2015), 
pp. 134-135.
 9. Barjot (2011), p. 784.
10. Baldwin and Cave (1999), pp. 165-166. Numa (2009), pp. 107, 121 and 125. Ortúñez 
(2014), p. 108. Ortúñez (2016a), p. 89. 
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profit of  the operation.11 Often, this association between private and public 
interests was sealed with the inclusion of  distinguished politicians on the 
boards of  the leasing companies.12
These partnerships aimed to harmonize the social function (public ser-
vice) of  railway transportation with the remuneration of  private equities.13 
Many considered them to be more efficient in economic terms, as they pro-
moted the long-term vision of  capitalist enterprise rather than the short-term 
vision of  political and partisan disputes, and they allowed states with limited 
resources to build large technical systems at a lower price.14 Supposedly, the 
long term of the concessions (usually 99 years) gave several advantages to the 
enterprise: (1) lessees could raise the capital more easily and they could plan 
the work more thoroughly; (2) risk was more equitably divided; (3) the final 
cost was lower; (4) there were broader stimuli to innovation and to fulfil the 
terms of  the contract more rapidly, and (5) the overall service was more com-
petitive and efficient. Additionally, the state, as owner of  the infrastructure, 
defined a set of  guidelines that favoured the quality of  the service, manageri-
al transparency and macroeconomic equilibrium.15 However, the interests and 
agendas of  private and public partners seldom are convergent. Furthermore, 
it is virtually impossible to anticipate every contingency that might compel 
one of  the parties to fail the terms of  the arrangement. In summary, often the 
symbiotic relationship provided, in theory, by public-private partnerships es-
calates to severe conflicts between the parties involved.16
Portuguese technocrats, engaged with Saint-Simonianist ideals since the 
1820s, also favoured state intervention in the railway sector. Similarly to what 
happened in Europe, in Portugal such involvement took the form of public-pri-
vate partnerships, as the state lacked the financial resources to build and oper-
ate railways. State engineers at the ministry of Obras Públicas [Public Works] 
surveyed the territory, seeking the best railway route; they assessed the propos-
als presented by investors interested in building railways in Portuguese territo-
ries; they presided over the public tenders and wrote the terms of the conces-
sion contracts; during construction, they supervised the work of the contractors, 
making sure they followed the specifications of the concession contracts, a task 
11. Numa (2009), pp. 110-112. 
12. Cuéllar (2018), pp. 530 and 538.
13. Barjot (2011), pp. 782 and 784-785. Bel (2011), p. 694. Numa (2009), p. 105. Ortúñez 
(2015), p. 130.
14. Public-private partnerships of the 1990s shared the same expectations. See Riess (2005), 
p. 11 and Marques (2018), p. 212.
15. Baldwin and Cave (1999), pp. 34-62 and 257-285. Barjot (2009), pp. 21 and 24. Marques 
(2018), pp. 211-212. Numa (2009), pp. 107, 114, 119, 121, 123 and 125. Ortúñez (2015), p. 136. 
Riess (2005), pp. 12 and 14.
16. Baldwin and Cave (1999), pp. 34-62 and 257-285. Marques (2018), p. 212. Numa (2009), 
p. 106. Ortúñez (2015), pp. 130 and 139. Ortúñez (2016a), p. 96.
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that was resumed during the operation of  the lines; some took executive roles 
in the boards of  private companies.17 
Intimately associated with the ministry of  Public Works, was the ministry 
of Fazenda [Finance] that often allocated its resources (either directly through 
taxes or indirectly through loans) to support private railway companies (with 
subsidies to construction, guarantees of  yield or by taking part of  share cap-
ital). Until the late 1870s, different governments preferred to subsidize con-
struction (through allowances that roughly covered half  the costs), which left 
companies financially vulnerable during operation, especially in areas of  low 
traffic. From 1881 onwards, entrepreneurs demanded guarantees of  yield to 
build and operate railways in the Portuguese territories. Before Ambaca, the 
Treasury guaranteed a yield to the companies operating the Western, Beira 
Baixa, Tua, and Viseu lines (on the mainland), and the Mormugão railway 
(in Goa, India).18
The general railway law of 31 December 1864 assured that the railway was 
considered public domain and could not be sold or foreclosed to any private 
entity. Usually, this guarantee was also included in the concession contract.19
Gradually, the idea that there should also be a public railway sector (built 
by the state or nationalized from private companies) gathered supporters. It 
was understood that a state railway sector would promote public service rath-
er than profit; therefore, it could defend the national interest more efficiently. 
In the late 1860s, the Portuguese government nationalized the southern and 
south-eastern lines in the province of Alentejo from its British concessionaire, 
the South Eastern of  Portugal Railway Company. A few years later, the gov-
ernment decided to build two additional lines in the northern provinces (the 
Minho and Douro railroads). Both sectors (state-owned and private with sig-
nificant intervention of  the state) coexisted until the end of  the nineteenth 
century and into the first decades of  the twentieth century.20
The Ambaca line was also the subject of  a public-private partnership, 
within the model described previously. Considering the anticipated costs, 
construction by the state was unadvisable. On the other hand, the involve-
ment of  the state was required to attract investors through a guarantee 
of  yield and given the specific nature of  the line: a colonial railway, a tool of 
empire and territorial appropriation, traversing a disputed territory in Ango-
la, in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference. Purportedly, state and the Royal 
Company engaged in a symbiotic partnership: the government guaranteed the 
firm remuneration on its investment and in return equipped the colony of An-
17. Pinheiro (2008), pp. 161-180. 
18. Alegria (1990), pp. 310-326. Kerr and Pereira (2012), pp. 176-177.
19. Pereira (2018a), p. 210.
20. Pinheiro (2008), pp. 125-126.
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gola with a powerful tool for development, modernity and political legitima-
tion. The engagement was clinched with the inclusion of  members of  the rul-
ing Partido Regenerador [Regeneration Party] in the administration of  the 
Royal Company.
Financing construction
The guarantee of  yield provided by the state was calculated over an esti-
mate of  the construction cost, set at 19.99 contos/km.21To bring budgets 
down, engineers suggested the use of  narrow gauge, a technical solution to 
build railways economically.22 The calculation of  the guarantee of  yield took 
into consideration three additional clauses, including gross revenue and ex-
penses (in contos/km):
• if: gross revenue ≤ 2 => expenses = 1.2 
• if: 2 < gross revenue ≤ 2.5 => expenses = 60% × gross revenue (max. 1.375)
• if: gross revenue > 2.5 => expenses = 55% × gross revenue
Additionally, the government also agreed to cover net losses, as claimed 
by the Royal Company, so that (values in contos/km):
• if: net profit < 6% × => guarantee = 6% × 19.99 – net profit
• if: gross revenue < expenditure => guarantee = expenditure – gross reve-
nue23
In short, the Portuguese state granted the firm two different subsidies, a 
complement of  net profit and a complement of  gross revenue. In theory, the 
company would enjoy an unburdened life: the government covered any loss-
es and guaranteed a 6% net profit. In return, the state was entitled to an ar-
ray of  regulatory powers that assured that the public interest was not neglect-
ed: state engineers supervised construction and operations (including the 
21. According to Mata (1993), 1 conto (1,000,000 réis) equals £222.222. Until 1890, this ex-
change rate was stable due to the inclusion of the Portuguese financial system in the gold standard. 
In 1891, a severe economic and financial crisis led to the exclusion of Portuguese currency from 
the gold standard and to its devaluation. See Mata (1991). Santos (2001). Exchange rates from 1891 
onwards are available at the Banco de Portugal [Bank of Portugal] website: www.bportugal.pt/Es-
tatisticasWeb (table 3, appendix). 
22. On the mainland, broad-gauge lines cost between 30 and 64 contos/km, whereas nar-
row-gauge tracks costed between 17 and 22 contos/km. Surveys in Angola estimated a cost of be-
tween 14 and 16 contos/km. The final estimate for the Ambaca railway met those figures halfway. 
See Pereira (2012), p. 109 and annexes 18 and 21. Pereira and Navarro (2018), pp. 357-359.
23. The original contract may be found in Portugal (1908), vol. 1, pp. 129-146.  
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number of trains per day and their minimum and maximum speeds); the com-
pany and the Treasury shared net profits over 8%; the company supplied ser-
vices to state departments free of  charge or at reduced prices; the government 
set maximum prices for fares.24 
To raise capital the company issued stocks and mainly bonds.25 Share cap-
ital was divided into 40,000 titles of  £20 each, or a grand total of  £800,000 
(3,600 contos). However, only 77% of the shares (totalling £616,000 or 2,772 
contos, see table 6, appendix) were subscribed, through a subsidiary firm of 
the Royal Company, the Sociedade Construtora do Caminho de Ferro de Am-
baca [Building Society of  the Ambaca Railway]. 
Debenture capital had no nominal limit, but debt service could not ex-
ceed £266.53/km (1.199 contos/km).26 Overall, the company issued loan 
stock worth £1,890,000 (8,505 contos), divided into 94,500 titles of  £20 each 
and an interest rate of  5%, or a debt service of  £259.61/km (1.168 contos/
km). To issue the bonds, the Royal Company hired the services of  Tadeusz 
Oksza-Orzechowski, the self-styled ‘Count’ Oksza,27 who signed a trustee 
contract with a British group (led by Gabriel Goldney, a British banker and 
politician),28 who was responsible for liberating the money and charging the 
5% interest. By 1899, the company had issued 94,500 bonds at 73% of its face 
value, in Amsterdam, Lisbon and Porto, but mostly in London.29
In short, the Royal Company had 8,930.25 contos to build the line: 2,721.6 
from share capital and 6,208.65 from debenture capital, or 24.53 contos/km.
The terms of  the loan were not uncommon. However, there was one de-
tail in the trustee agreement that could raise serious legal and diplomatic dis-
putes: the contract stipulated that the railway itself  would serve as collateral 
in case of  default. This was common procedure for British railway companies 
(mortgage bonds), but completely illegal according to the Portuguese law 
that, besides not recognising the figure of  mortgage bonds,30 considered rail-
ways as part of  the public domain that could not be alienated by the govern-
24. On the importance of railway fares as a regulating instrument, see: Ortúñez (2009), p. 145.
25. A common practice in European railway companies. Considering that bondholders could 
not vote in the general assemblies, the promoters could finance the enterprise without losing con-
trol of the company. However, in the long term, the company was more liable to financial problems. 
See Caron (1997-2005), vol. 2, p. 37. Nadal (1982), pp. 39-41. Ortúñez (2014), p. 108. Ortúñez 
(2016a), p. 92. Pereira (2012), p. 372. 
26. The equivalent to the value guaranteed by the state (6% of 19.99 contos), for a total ex-
tension of 364 km.
27. Born in 1838 in Busha (Ukraine), ‘Count’ Oksza was a medical doctor by training and a 
diplomat by heart, with contacts all over Europe (from the Sublime Port to Portugal, including Aus-
tria, Poland, Rome, Spain and France). According to one of his contacts, “He led one of those mys-
terious lives that were better left in the shade than to be brought to the light of day”. He died, al-
most completely ruined, in 1902. Kieniewicz (1979).
28. The Railway Times (henceforth RT), 52-24-2605 (10 December 1887), p. 770. 
29. Royal Company Annual Report, 1918-1919, p. 45.
30. Portugal (1899), pp. 12-20. Portugal (1912a), pp. 69-73. Portugal (1913), p. 23.
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ment under any circumstance. In other words, by this condition the company 
would give as a warranty a property it did not own. Nonetheless, the contract 
was signed and sanctioned by the Portuguese consul in London, Mr Anselmo 
Ferreira Pinto Basto. 
If  the company paid the interests due to the bondholders, there would be 
no cause for concern, and apparently the guarantee of  yield granted by the 
state was enough: annually, it was equal to 6% of 19.99 contos/km; if  the ex-
tension of  the line was 364 km, the guarantee would come to 436.58 contos/
year, enough to cover the interest due to the bondholders (5% of 8,505 con-
tos or 425.5 contos/year). The stockholders, that is, the Building Society, 
would barely receive any dividend (11.33 contos or 0.41% return rate). In any 
case, the Building Society’s profit lay elsewhere, in the construction itself, and 
its mission was just to function as a subsidiary of  the Royal Company.
In summary, it all depended on the construction costs and operational ex-
penses. If  the cost of  construction was under 24.53 contos/km and expenses 
fell within the intervals determined in the leasing contract (see above), the 
guarantee of yield would be enough. If  net profit exceeded 6%, the stockhold-
ers could even gain. 
The dark contours of a public-private partnership,  
or Murphy’s law applied
Considering the abovementioned circumstances, the success of the part-
nership seemed probable. However, all the things that could go wrong in the 
Ambaca railway did go wrong: construction cost was greater than anticipated 
and operational revenues fell far short of expectations, a very common situa-
tion in public works and public-private partnerships.31 Furthermore, the ex-
change rate of the Portuguese currency dropped after the 1891 financial crisis, 
which meant that the guarantee of yield (paid in réis) gradually covered a 
smaller percentage of the interest due (paid to the bondholders in pounds ster-
ling). The perfect storm that was brought about by these events tested the lim-
its of the relationship between state and private interests in the railway sector.
Higher construction costs
Despite the willingness of  the government to aid the construction process 
(by rapidly approving the construction projects, extending several legal dead-
lines, protecting the construction site from attacks from native peoples, or 
paying the guarantee of  yield in advance, against the better judgement of  the 
31. Broder (2012), p. 35. Pereira (2012), p. 279-297. Riess (2005), p. 29.
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general-director of  the colonies),32 the works proceeded very sluggishly, due 
to the natural obstacles of  the terrain (thick vegetation, tropical climate), dif-
ficulties in hiring workers and transporting them (and the building materials) 
to the construction sites, and a lack of  water and food in some disease-ridden 
areas. Additionally, a legal dispute between the Building Society and its sub-
contractor led to the termination of  the construction agreement in 1890. Two 
years after works began, only 45 km of track were laid down; in 1891, when 
the line should have been inaugurated, its mileage was only half  of  what was 
contracted; in 1899, eight years after the deadline, the full extension of  the 
line to Ambaca was finally inaugurated (Table 1). Besides the delay, the qual-
ity of  the tracklaying was also poor, which had future consequences on the 
operation.
32. Some of the projects presented by the company’s engineers were considered very incom-
plete by the advisory board of the ministry of Public Works, which did not prevent the government 
from approving them. Arquivo Histórico da Economia, Conselho de Obras Públicas e Minas, boxes 
32 (1887), 33 (1887), 34 (1888), 36 (1891), 37 (1891-1892), 40 (1893-1894), and 43 (1895), seve-
ral reports.
TABLE 1 ▪ Stations on the Ambaca and Malange lines. Grey areas show stations in the 
Cazengo region
Station
Altitude (m 
above sea 
level)
Distances (km)
Opening
From km 0
Between 
stations
Luanda 3.2 0.0 –
1 January 1889
Cidade Alta 36.9 3.7 3.7
Cacuaco 3.8 20.2 16.6
Quifandongo 6.4 28.3 8.0
Funda 11.2 45.8 17.5
km 60 16.4 60.0 14.2
Cabiri 19.3 69.5 9.5
1 February 1890Catete 41.5 95.8 26.3
km 100 15.4 100.0 4.2
Cunga 17.0 117.0 17.0
28 December 1890
Cassoneca 42.5 140.0 23.0
Barraca 153.5 158.7 18.7
18 April 1891
Calunguembo 129.0 180.0 21.3
(Continued on next page)
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Construction costs rose to 12,733 contos, but were officially set at 12,459 
contos or 34.23 contos/km (total length, 354 km), a figure far superior to the 
very optimistic 19.99 contos/km estimated during the surveys.33 The compa-
ny also received more than anticipated, due to the devaluation of  the Portu-
guese currency (debenture capital for construction was transferred in pounds, 
but payments to workers and contractors were made in réis). In total, the 
company received 9,441.14 contos. 
33. Royal Company Annual Report, several years.
Station
Altitude (m 
above sea 
level)
Distances (km)
Opening
From km 0
Between 
stations
Zenza do Itombe 69.4 190.0 10.0
17 April 1892
Cassoalala 34.9 219.7 29.7
Oeiras 41.8 228.1 8.4
25 June 1893
km 240 138.6 240.0 11.9
Tala Quizanga 329.7 253.3 13.3
23 November 1893
km 260 231.5 260.0 6.7
Luinha 209.3 261.4 1.4
29 July 1894
km 280 284.5 280.0 18.6
Canhoca 321.5 287.2 7.2 28 September 1894
Queta 489.0 299.6 12.4 9 June 1895
km 308 – 308.0 8.5 7 June 1896
N’dale Tanda – 321.0 13.0 18 November 1898
Camoma – 337.0 16.0
23 January 1899
km 340 – 340.0 3.0
Ambaca – 354.0 15.0 8 June 1899
km 360 – 360.0 5.0 27 July 1899
Lucala 690.5 364.0 4.0 8 September 1899
Quizenga 802.6 394.9 36.7
8 September 1907Cacuso 1,064.2 431.6 16.7
Matete 1,087.1 448.3 31.3
Lombe 1,088.6 479.6 23.8
1 September 1908
Malange 1,162.5 503.4 –
Source: Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (henceforth AHU), items 299-1H, 301-1H, 927-1N, 2564-1B, 2565-1B, 2756-1B.
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Depressing performance during operation 
Operation figures were disastrous, since its very beginning in 1888. Until 
1910, the company accumulated losses; in that year operation paid 95 contos 
or 0.261 contos/km (Figure 1). Freight was the main source of  revenue, espe-
cially after 1892 (Figures 2 and 3). In any case, the figures of  transport were 
low, even when compared to other mainland lines with less traffic.34 Conse-
quently, throughout the years, the collection of  rolling stock remained the 
same, with 21-23 locomotives, 29-33 coaches, and 208-212 wagons.35 The line 
traversed barren and unpopulated regions over most of  its reach and suffered 
from competition with a more efficient and cheaper alternative: the steamer 
operating on the Kwanza River. Many expected coffee to become one of  the 
most valuable commodities, but the drop in its international price hampered 
production and exportation from Angola. Others suggested that the perfor-
mance of the line would improve when it tapped into the Cazengo region. The 
railway arrived in Cazengo between 1892 and 1898 (Table 1), but the impact 
on the figures of  operation was minimal. Angola was not the wealthy Eldo-
rado that Portuguese technocrats on the mainland had imagined.
34. Cf. Portugal (1912b).
35. AHU, items 2463-1B, 2507-1B, 2599-1B, 2701-1B, 3034-2-1A.
FIGURE 1 ▪ Gross revenue, expenditure and net operational result (contos)
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FIGURE 2 ▪ Passenger (left axle) and freight transport (right axle, in t)
 
0 
5.000 
10.000 
15.000 
20.000 
25.000 
30.000 
0 
10.000 
20.000 
30.000 
40.000 
50.000 
60.000 
70.000 
18
89
 
18
90
 
18
91
 
18
92
 
18
93
 
18
94
 
18
95
 
18
96
 
18
97
 
18
98
 
18
99
 
19
00
 
19
01
 
19
02
 
19
03
 
19
04
 
19
05
 
19
06
 
19
07
 
19
08
 
19
09
 
19
10
 
19
11
 
19
12
 
19
13
 
Passengers
Freight
Source: AHU, items 299-1H, 2756-1B.
FIGURE 3 ▪ Revenue components
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As for expenditure, locomotives were the main expense until 1895. The 
engines (manufactured in Europe by Henschel & Sohn) broke down often, as 
they were manoeuvred by rookie engine drivers and they used coal and water 
of  poor quality. Therefore, they required intensive and expensive mainte-
nance.36 From 1896 onwards, when the railway extended across 308 km of the 
Angolan landscape, track maintenance became the largest component of  ex-
penditure (Figure 4). The same obstacles that had hampered construction 
(rainy/tropical climate, thick vegetation) contributed to the erosion of  the 
track. Moreover, the track had been laid down very poorly from the start. 
Consequently, accidents (particularly derailments) became frequent (Table 2) 
and the service became irregular, extremely sluggish (average speeds of  19 
km/h), and therefore unreliable.
36. AHU, items 352-1D, 358-1D, 2598-1B, reports 7 July 1890, 28 March 1892 and 13 Feb-
ruary 1900.
FIGURE 4 ▪ Expenditure components
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Reaction of the state and the Royal Company
What did all this mean to the Royal Company and its partnership with the 
Portuguese state? Since construction had cost more than anticipated, the 
guarantee of  yield provided by the state soon became insufficient to cover the 
debt service (Tables 4 to 6, Appendix). To make matters worse, with the esca-
lation of  the financial crisis in Portugal, a gradual depreciation of  the ex-
change rate was noted (Table 3, Appendix).37 The interest had to be paid in 
pounds sterling, which meant that each passing year in the 1890s and after 
World War I, the amount of  resources the company had to allocate was grad-
ually higher. 
Therefore, the state had to intervene in the company to prevent its de-
fault. Gradually, as often happens in public-private partnerships, the symbi-
otic relationship between state and private initiative escalated to a conflict-
37. Mata (1991). A similar situation was affecting Spain at the same time. Cuéllar (2018), pp. 
541-543. Ortúñez (2016b), p. 234.
TABLE 2 ▪ Accidents and victims during operation
Years
Accidents Victims
Derailments Other Total Deceased Injured Total
1893 80 52 134 5 5 10
1894 72 46 118 4 2 6
1895 115 108 223 0 1 1
1896 61 142 203 4 5 9
1897 68 298 366 3 3 6
1898 108 125 233 4 5 9
1900 88 130 218 2 2 4
1901 106 66 172 5 3 8
1904 49 122 171 0 1 1
1905 59 9 68 0 2 2
1906 53 – 53 4 4 8
1907 72 – 72 1 5 6
1908 51 29 80 0 1 1
1909 50 – 50 0 1 1
1910 57 1 58 0 2 2
Source: AHU, items 2463-1B, 2507-1B, 2559-1B, 2701-1B.
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ual relationship, with less transparent contours surrounding a disastrous 
contract.38
The state started aiding the company from 1888 as warrantor in different 
financial operations. From 1891 onwards, the state’s support was more asser-
tive, by lending money (guaranteed by sundry debt titles possessed by the 
company) and by paying the guarantee of  yield in advance.39 In that year, 
without state support, the company would not have had enough capital to 
pay its debts (Table 6, Appendix). Indeed, as soon as 1890, there were some 
difficulties in paying suppliers, which apparently led to the untimely termina-
tion of  the agreement with the contractor hired by the Building Society.
As these allowances were not enough, the state signed an addendum to 
the original contract, on 20 October 1894. By this new agreement, the state 
extended the deadline for the company to pay its debt and agreed to pay the 
subsidies monthly. Additionally, it lent a sum equivalent to the anticipated 
devaluation of  the Portuguese currency. In return, from 1 January 1895 on-
wards, there was a deduction of  0.3 contos/km in the guarantee of  yield (used 
to pay the firm’s debt to the government); furthermore, the formula to calcu-
late the subsidy was altered: 
• if: gross revenue ≤ 2 => expenses = 0.9
• if: 2 < gross revenue ≤ 2.5 => expenses = 45% × gross revenue (max 1.075)
• if: gross revenue > 2.5 => expenses = 43% × gross revenue40
Again, this new deal failed to solve the financial predicaments faced by 
the company. Therefore, in the following years until the turn of  the century, 
the state was forced to provide further assistance, including sundry loans and 
advances, covering the currency devaluation (until 1908)41 and in some years 
the devolution of  the 0.3 contos/km charged under the 1894 contract (Tables 
5 and 6), some of  which was lacking the necessary parliamentary authoriza-
tion.42 
Still, the company was in a dire situation. As the state could hardly con-
tinue to inject more public funds, it decided to engage in a strategy of  provid-
ing other sorts of  help, like improving accessibility to the line (the construc-
38. Marques (2018), p. 211-212. The Royal Company also took private loans, less substan-
tial, which were eventually redeemed.
39. In the Spanish railway system, this solution also became frequent. Ortúñez (2009), p. 146. 
Pascual (2000), p. 16.
40. The original contract may be found in: Portugal (1908), vol. 2, pp. 801-814.
41. Portugal (1913), p. 14.
42. Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático (henceforth AHD), S12-E14-P2-N75456-P32-107-163, 
letter 25 June 1902. AHU, 3034-1-1A, report 25 February 1898. Portugal (1908), p. 982 and 988-
989. Portugal (1912a), pp. 20-31.
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tion of roads and the purchase of a road locomotive).43 In 1896, the company’s 
board proposed a rise in fares to increase its revenues. This measure countered 
the potential of the line to promote the colonization and commercial exploita-
tion of  Angola and overall public interest. Local coffee producers protested, 
in a context of  low prices for coffee,44 and the state did all it could to post-
pone its application. 
Eventually, the rise was accepted by the government, by a contract signed 
on 11 March 1897 and approved by the parliament on 19 September 1897. 
However, the government did not give in to all the company’s demands. To 
placate the coffee producers, the increase in coffee fares was limited. Fares 
were indexed to the evolution of  the price of  coffee in the international mar-
kets. The result was that the company only received about 70% of what it ex-
pected (between 1901 and 1908 the loss amounted to 560 contos, Table 7). 
Moreover, it was stipulated that the extra revenue should be applied ex-
clusively to cover the company’s debt service (including the currency devalu-
ation), and to build the extension of  the Ambaca line to the rubber-produc-
ing region of  Malange, where settlers had demanded a railway link at least 
since 1888.45 The Royal Company was also compelled to keep up double ac-
counting, registering its revenues by the new and the old fares, which allowed 
me to calculate its profit at 1,508 contos (Table 8). 
43. Portugal (1899), pp. 20-31. Portugal (1908), pp. 801-814, 984, 1071-1072 and 1146.
44. Portugal (1909b), pp. 52-53.
45. RT, 54-19-2653 (10 November 1888), p. 632. 
TABLE 7 ▪ Coffee fares (contos)
Year Revenue Revenue expected by the company
1901 18.57 22.77
1902 44.27 59.84
1903 60.55 83.12
1904 63.32 82.78
1905 56.54 77.64
1906 66.33 92.75
1907 53.25 76.26
1908 47.02 67.63
Total 409.85 562.79
Source: AHU, item 2676-1B.
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However, this capital was totally absorbed by the debt service and it was 
only used to extend the line to Lucala (Table 1). Consequently, in 1902, the 
government decided to alter the 1897 contract and build that line using its 
own experts and resources to promote the colonization of  the Malange and 
Lunda districts and contribute to increasing the revenues of  the Royal Com-
pany (alleviating its debt service). The Malange line became another stage of 
the partnership with the Royal Company. The fares were not reduced, but the 
surplus over the original tariffs were considered a state revenue, lent to the 
company. 
TABLE 8 ▪ Comparison between revenues from the Ambaca line (old fares vs new fares)
Years Revenues – old fares Revenues – new fares Difference
1897 133.27 159.64 26.37
1898 96.11 157.22 61.11
1899 123.17 205.72 82.55
1900 158.07 253.19 95.13
1901 141.75 225.62 83.87
1902 148.95 229.84 80.89
1903 166.95 258.00 91.05
1904 n/a n/a n/a
1905 167.14 243.46 76.32
1906 181.34 252.54 71.20
1907 158.22 237.60 79.38
1908 156.26 246.23 89.98
1909 176.93 273.59 96.66
1910 239.08 406.30 167.21
1911 173.18 271.95 98.77
1912 167.87 285.86 117.99
1913 178.97 302.52 123.56
1914 167.97 234.38 66.41
Total 1,508.44
Source: AHU, items 490-1F, 575-1F, 576-1F, 927-1N, 2463-1B, 2507-1B, 2516-1B, 2559-1B, 2701-1B.
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The Malange extension
Works on the Malange extension began in May 1903. Six years later, the 
line was ready (after a two-and-a-half-year delay). State engineers were re-
sponsible for the project for the entire line (the surveys made by the company 
in 1889 and 1901 were ignored).46 During construction, Portuguese staff  and 
navvies faced the usual difficulties encountered in laying rails in Africa, plus 
the bureaucratic nuisances imposed by the state administration. When the 
work was done, the total cost was calculated at 2,245 contos or 16.08 contos/
km (Table 9), half  the cost of  the Ambaca railway, and around 66% of the 
1901 budget provided by the Royal Company.
Operation began in September 1907 and was entrusted to the Royal Com-
pany, which received a payment of  1.05 contos/km/year.47 Many engineers 
and colonial administrators recommended that the state handle the opera-
tion, charging low fares and favouring commerce and the colonization of  the 
territory. Others suggested the extension of the line to the shores of the Kwan-
go and Cassai rivers (on the north-eastern and eastern borders with the Con-
go Free State), including a couple of  smaller branches, to exploit the rubber 
fields between those two rivers, connect Luanda with the copper mine of  Ka-
tanga, and promote the Portuguese presence in the area. Surveys were or-
dered, and construction was approved but never began. The state preferred 
46. AHU, item 461-1F, report 18 July 1901.
47. AHU, item 2564-1B, letters 28 June 1907, and 25 and 29 January 1908. Portugal (1909b). 
TABLE 9 ▪ Construction costs, Malange line (contos)
Years Staff Material Transportation Storage Total
1902-1903 17.34 23.62  4.34 0 45.30
1903-1904 57.75 137.58 15.33 2.63 213.29
1904-1905 63.62 311.91 64.10 16.56 456.19
1905-1906 64.00 220.89 63.02 10.79 358.70
1906-1907 65.02 383.16 76.34 10.75 535.27
1907-1908 53.42 211.57 36.54 2.32 303.86
1908-1909 66.86 212.56 49.40 3.90 332.71
Total 2,245.33
Total/km (139.6 km) 16.08
Source: AHU, item 2526-1B.
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to keep the operation under one single entity.48 Nevertheless, in February 
1909, the company refused to resume operation and handed it back to the 
government, during a period where the relationship between the company and 
the state was already conflictual. An abnormal situation emerged, with a con-
tinuous line being operated by two different entities. Additionally, the com-
pany refused to arrange an agreement for through-traffic. Goods and passen-
gers had to change trains when they arrived at Ambaca. The Malange line 
became a railway island in the Angolan wilderness. 
Operation figures were unimpressive, and the net revenue was almost con-
stantly negative until 1914 (Figures 5 and 6). It comes with no surprise that 
the impact of  the Malange line on the Ambaca railway was very limited (Fig-
ures 1 and 2).
48. AHU, item 497-1F, report 5 March 1911; 2564-1B, report 16 March 1907; 2665-1B, re-
port 12 April 1912; 3024-1A, several reports. Portugal (1912a), pp. 18-25 e 45-49.
FIGURE 5 ▪  Gross revenue, expenditure and net result of the Malange line (contos)
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Assessment of the impact of the Ambaca railway in the region
One of the goals of  the public investment in the Ambaca and Malange 
railways was to promote the colonization and exploitation of  the resources 
of  the Angolan hinterland. Such a goal could be compatible with the dire fi-
nancial overview I have described thus far. Often, investments can be benefi-
cial to the general public (in this case, I mean the Portuguese settlers and co-
lonial authorities living and working in the region between Luanda and 
Malange), albeit unprofitable for their investors. It is not easy to determine 
and quantify the influence of  both railways on the Angolan colonial econo-
my. The grandiose expectations of  the Portuguese technocrats were not met, 
although trade, local production, and the settlement of  Europeans in Ango-
la were favoured.
The records of  the custom house of  Luanda clearly illustrate an increase 
in both imports and exports, which coincides with the openings of  the rail-
ways. Yearly averages of  imports and exports rose from £462,000/year before 
1889 to £836,000/year after that year. The evolution illustrated in Figure 7 is 
very similar to the evolution of  freight portrayed previously in Figure 2. It 
is impossible to account for all the factors that contributed to the increase of 
commercial movement in Luanda’s custom house, but it is highly likely that 
the main reason was indeed the railway.
FIGURE 6 ▪  Evolution of the transportation of passengers (right axle) and freight  
(left axle, in t)
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A necessarily short analysis of  freight indicates the main goods transport-
ed on the Ambaca and Malange lines (Tables 10 and 11). A large part of  the 
items transported were directly associated with the construction of  the track 
itself  (railway and telegraph material, food for workers, grass cut from the 
track bed), but there were some flows of  colonial products and goods usual-
ly associated with the colonization effort. As for the former, Table 10 hints at 
the development of  coffee production. Rubber also became an important 
commodity, even if  we bear in mind that the railway only arrived at the rub-
ber-producing zone of  Malange in the early 1900s. Items which were crucial 
for the establishment of European settlers in Africa (building materials, hous-
ing items, salt, brandy and wine) have a strong presence in the sources, sug-
gesting that the railway was an important tool for the colonization of  Ango-
la. Finally, Figure 8 suggests the promotion of  cattle raising activities (93,000 
heads transported between 1889 and 1914).
FIGURE 7 ▪  Evolution of imports and exports registered in Luanda custom house 
(pounds converted from contos)
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The performance of the stations (Figure 9) suggests an increase in the eco-
nomic activity of  the hinterland served by the Ambaca/Malange line. By 
1910, Luanda was undoubtedly the most important station on the line, but 
Lucala, deep in the Angolan countryside at the limits of  the rubber-region of 
Malange was turning into the second most important station.
TABLE 10 ▪ Main goods transported by the railway between Luanda, Ambaca and 
Malange, 1892-1897, 1899, 1904-1914
Goods Weight (t)
Coffee 52,088
Building material 50,957
Grass 38,282
Railway and telegraph material 31,703
Food for workers 20,013
Housing and colonization items 16,696
Wine and brandy 16,490
Flour 12,569
Grain, fruit and vegetables 12,224
Salt 11,966
Rubber 9,173
Coal, fuel and lubricants 7,046
Sundry seeds 4,078
Sundry goods 3,800
Oils 2,525
Cotton 1,648
Animals and animal products 1,560
Weaponry 915
Sugar 852
Assorted drugs and chemical items 836
Tobacco 427
Source: AHU, items 301-1H, 2463-1B, 2507-1B, 2559-1B, 2564-1B, 2676-1B, 2701-1B, 2756-1B.
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FIGURE 8 ▪ Cattle transported in the Ambaca and Malange lines (heads)
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FIGURE 9 ▪ Evolution of the stations revenues (contos)
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The Malange section provides interesting, albeit narrow, data about who 
were the users of  the rail service: state or private sector agents (Table 11). Pri-
vate sector was predominant in the expedition of  cargo and, from 1911 on-
wards, in the transport of  passengers as well. Even though the railway was 
used by the state to extend its influence, it was mostly used by private entre-
preneurs.
Figures regarding passengers are interesting and somewhat revealing. 
Around 1,000,000 people rode the trains between 1889 and 1914 (average of 
38,000 passengers/year), a very modest number. One could argue that the rail-
way was important to populate the Angolan hinterland, unfortunately statis-
tics do not discriminate the travel direction (upward/downward).
Regardless, although the lines did increase economic activity in the area, 
the outputs of  the colonization effort provided by the railways were timid, es-
pecially when compared with the cost the state sustained for an enterprise that 
for all due effects was private, and that by 1913 totalled almost 19,000 contos 
or an average of  52 contos for each km of the Ambaca line (Table 12).
TABLE 11 ▪ Users of the Malange railway
Year
Passengers Freight (t)
State Private sector State Private sector
1909 7,765 4,389 200.03 4,348.09 
1910 7,049 5,064 162.73 5,409.75 
1911 2,449 5,298 83.65 4,238.58 
1912 1,271 6,024 137.94 4,381.55 
1913 1,810 4,946 201.34 4,044.60 
1914 2,962 5,497 142.56 4,153.40 
Source: AHU, items 2564-1B, 2565-1B.
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TABLE 12 ▪ Public investment in the Ambaca railway
Year
Guarantee 
of yield 
and other 
allowances
Fares Survey
Malange line Total
Construction
Operation 
(Royal 
Company)
Operation 
(state)
Contos Pounds
1889 131.25 – 43.14 – – – 174.39 38,753
1890 214.90 – 11.57 – – – 226.47 50,327
1891 1,823.04 – 18.12 – – – 1,841.16 378,217
1892 1,614.89 – 17.70 – – – 1,632.59 284,522
1893 648.99 –  6.89 – – – 655.87 117,036
1894 738.84 – – – – – 738.84 127,496
1895 424.24 – – – – – 424.24 74,441
1896 445.36 – – – – – 445.36 76,026
1897 469.47 – – – – – 469.47 71,381
1898 496.17 – – – – – 496.17 69,220
1899 587.28 – – – – – 587.28 91,462
1900 581.63 – – – – – 581.63 91,972
1901 573.58 – – – – – 573.58 89,846
1902 569.43 – –  45.30 – – 614.73 107,395
1903 555.59 91.05 – 213.29 – – 859.93 154,054
1904 545.26 – – 456.19 – – 1,001.45 184,906
1905 556.44 76.32 – 358.70 – – 991.46 206,683
1906 542.02 71.20 – 535.27 – – 1,148.49 250,543
1907 563.24 79.38 – 303.86  48.86 – 995.34 214,144
1908 556.20 89.98 – 332.71 146.58 – 1,125.47 216,104
1909 563.26 96.66 – – 24.43 – 684.35 131,809
1910 496.94 167.21 – – – –12.35 664.15 135,596
1911 561.72 98.77 – – – 27.73 660.49 135,070
1912 567.33 117.99 – – – 29.36 685.32 137,725
1913 548.11 123.56 – – – 47.79 671.67 127,986
Total 18,949.91 3,562,715
Total/km (364 km) 52.06 9,788
Source: previous tables.
17831 RHI77_3es.indb   77 12/11/19   15:00
The Ambaca railway in Angola
78
The final years of the Ambaca problem until nationalization
By 1914, the details surrounding the Ambaca deal were scandalous. World 
War I brought further disarray to the operation in Angola and the financial 
situation of  the Portuguese exchequer. In the 1920s the devaluation of  the 
Portuguese currency was drastic. Neither the Royal Company nor the state 
could pay the interest in pounds (in 1924, annual interest surpassed 12,000 
contos). Payments ceased in 1919, after the Portuguese government took 
compulsorily possession of  the operation of  the line. Details of  this process 
are again provided by Guimarães and Navarro (Note 4). 
Both parties blamed each other for the situation of  the company. The 
deadlock in finding an equitable solution accentuated frustrations and entan-
gled the situation even further, as often happens in situation of  discordance.49 
The official rhetoric of  the state vehemently criticized the company, seek-
ing the support of  public opinion.50 State representatives highlighted the high 
cost of  construction, the shady contours of  financing, and its feeble impact 
on the development of  Angola. Criticism was particularly sharp from the re-
publican governments (since 1910), determined to succeed where the monar-
chic regime had failed so enormously.
The Royal Company blamed the government for the financial crises of the 
1890s, currency devaluation, unilateral termination of  an agreement signed 
in 1891,51 and the alteration of  the 1894 contract, some technical details re-
quired by the contract, payment for sundry transport services provided to 
state officials, lands neighbouring the track that were never delivered, and the 
absence of  supporting infrastructures (like roads) in Angola. From 1900, it 
demanded an arbitrage that settled the dispute, a demand that was always re-
fused by the state. Often, this rhetoric evolved to retaliatory measures, like 
cuts in the operation, keeping coffee fares at maximum levels, or refusing 
through-traffic arrangements at the junction with the Malange line.
Both parties refused the accusations and the demands they made upon 
each other were very different. By 1909, the state claimed the company owed 
a debt of  5,881 contos, whereas the company demanded a compensation of 
10,548 contos. Three years later, those demands evolved to 5,329 and 12,041 
contos, respectively.
Several solutions were suggested to put an end to the conflict. The most 
moderate included giving over large areas of  land in Malange and Lunda, 
augmenting fares, increasing the company’s equity or giving equity to the 
state, renegotiating the trustee agreement, or leasing the operation to the state. 
49. Goncalves (2008), pp. 66-70. Rothman (1997), pp. 5-6.
50. For the importance of acquiring the support of public opinion, see Ortúñez (2009), p. 152.
51. That granted the company a monthly allowance of 135 contos. 
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An arbitration in 1911 just entangled the issue even further. A bill to author-
ize the government to lease the operation of  the line was never discussed in 
parliament. Direct negotiations with the trustees also led to nothing.52
More extreme measures included nationalization, debated at least since 
1898.53 Since railways were considered part of  the public domain, nationali-
zation actually meant the transfer of  the management of  the line to public 
authorities.54 Usually, this operation could be done in several ways, which 
were also at the disposal of  the Portuguese authorities: purchasing the con-
cession back from the company, early termination of  the concession (includ-
ing the payment of  an annual compensation according to its original terms), 
or waiting for the bankruptcy of  the company.55 
Normally, nationalization processes are motivated by economic, financial, 
or technical reasoning, and not by ideological motives.56 Historically, howev-
er, nationalization was also connoted with a strong presence of  the state in 
the economy and an answer to the predicaments caused by foreign invest-
ments in public services. Therefore, it was a popular decision, albeit a difficult 
one to implement, for financial and bureaucratic reasons.57 As mentioned be-
fore, in the Portuguese mainland railway system, the creation of  a state rail-
way sector and the debate about nationalization of  the entire system dates to 
the 1860s. In the colonial context, public control of  railways had the addition-
al attraction of contributing to the colonization effort and shunning away for-
eign influences.
In 1914, the government determined the compulsory appropriation of the 
company’s revenues, claiming that the company failed to keep the track in per-
fect working order, as stated in the concession contract. The breakout of 
World War I postponed its application. After the war, the process was re-
sumed. By decree of  13 July 1918, the state forcefully took over the operation 
of  the line and offered a compensation of  488 contos/year to the stockhold-
ers (61,655 pounds, about two thirds the annuity due in that year). The com-
pany refused the compensation and always considered the decision a nefari-
52. AHD, S12-E14-P2-N75456-P32-107-163, letters 19 June 1902 and 2 December 1912, 
and report 30 November 1912. AHU, item 2564-1B, reports 16 March 1907 and 25 January 1908; 
3034-1-1A, minute 16 August 1899. RT, 76-18-3225 (28 October 1898), p. 564. Portugal (1909b). 
Portugal (1912a), pp. 31-33, 40-49 e 77-78. Portugal (1913), pp. 15-22.
53. RT, 74-12-3167 (17 September 1898), p. 385.
54. Barjot (2009), p. 20.
55. Barjot (2011), p. 784.
56. Andersson-Skog (2000), pp. 34-37.. Barjot (2009), pp. 15 and 25. Crompton (1999), p. 141. 
Ortúñez (2009), p. 143.
57. Barjot (2009), pp. 14-17 and 24. In the Ambaca case, not only the state did not have re-
sources to nationalize the line, but also the Royal Company disagreed on the value of the compen-
sation. Additionally, nationalizing the company could have diplomatic ramifications, as it could 
threaten the financial interests of the bondholders and the colonial agenda of Britain.
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ous extorsion. Payments to the company were suspended in January 1919. 
The firm kept registering these figures, as sums that were owed by the state.
The matter was taken to court but remained undecided for years. A sentence 
in favour of the company ordering the state to pay 5,451 contos was not abid-
ed by. The trustees applied for help from the British Foreign Office.58 In 1921, 
negotiations for a settlement began, with no practical result.59 To make matters 
worse, the company saw its name involved with Alves Reis, the perpetrator of 
the Bank of Portugal scandal of 1925. No agreement was reached before a new 
coup d’état instituted a right-wing dictatorship in Portugal, in 1926. By 1928, 
the year of the last available annual report, the company claimed a debt of 
116,000 contos, a sum that even the board considered to be of moral rather than 
a practical value.60 In 1933, the government proposed the transformation of the 
company’s debt to the state in equity, providing that the company redeemed all 
its bonds. The plan did not work. Five years later, the government decided to 
issue debt titles to buy the company, redeem its bonds, liquidate it, and take 
full possession of  the line.
Conclusion
When the public-private partnership between the Portuguese government 
and the Royal Company was established in 1885, most believed it would ben-
efit both entities: it would pay the company’s investment and it would con-
tribute to the colonizing mission of  Portugal in Angola. Borrowing the ex-
pression of  Cuéllar, there was no clear distinction between private interests 
and public wellbeing.61 However, soon the facts contradicted those expecta-
tions. Construction cost more, and operation paid less than anticipated. The 
state had the right to supervise both stages, but in practical terms, the lack of 
staff  for the task restricted that prerogative.
In theory, the state could just let the company default and take possession 
of  the line. Nevertheless, the contours of  its financing rendered that option 
impracticable. The company had become too big to fail, and the state was 
forced to intervene, in theory to protect public interest, in practice to defend 
private interests. 
The problem had two distinct faces. Firstly, if  the company defaulted, it 
would erode the credit of  Portugal in the financial markets and trigger a dip-
lomatic dispute similar to that faced by Portugal in the late 1860s with two 
58. Royal Company Annual Report, 1918-1919, p.45.
59. Royal Company Annual Report, 1919-1920, pp. 55-77. 
60. Royal Company Annual Report, 1927-1928, p. 9.
61. Cuéllar (2018), pp. 524.
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mainland companies,62 and in the 1890s after the confiscation of the Delagoa 
Bay Railway in the south of Mozambique.63 Secondly, the line was given as col-
lateral to the trustees representing the bondholders. Albeit illegal, the trustees 
could claim possession of the railway in case of non-payment.64 The Portuguese 
government could argue in a court of law that the mortgage was illegal, and 
therefore the bondholders had no claim over the line, but if  this happened, the 
company’s creditors would certainly appeal to the British Foreign Office and 
the London Stock Exchange to stop trading Portuguese debt titles – as had hap-
pened so many times in the past.65 Considering that Portugal financed its an-
nual deficit with state securities issued abroad, this could have disastrous con-
sequences for the national economy. In the event of Portugal being forced to 
forfeit the line,66 it would lose control of a powerful tool of the empire and co-
lonial appropriation that could jeopardize its very sovereignty over the north-
ern regions of Angola. It comes with no surprise that colonial authorities of 
the time considered the trusteeship a terrible, menacing and dangerous deal that 
loomed over an important technical and political instrument. All things con-
sidered, the government had little choice but to help the company, preventing 
its default, and to keep any intervention of the British trustees at bay. 
What does this all mean or add to the debate about the relationship be-
tween the state and private enterprise through the establishment of public-pri-
vate partnerships? The case of  the Ambaca railway replicates similar situa-
tions in Portugal and other European countries, specifically Spain and France, 
the two nations that influenced the Portuguese railway policy the most. How-
ever, it innovates as it includes the complexities of  the colonial setting and the 
strains between two imperial nations (Portugal and Britain).
In Portugal, in previous public-private agreements, the state gave further 
assistance to other railway companies in need, both on the mainland and in 
the colonies, either by buying back the firms’ equity and debt or by creating 
new taxes to grant additional subsidies to pay the bondholders (and to a less-
er extent the stockholders).67 The company of  the Ambaca railway was just 
another name on that list, even though the size of  the assistance provided was 
far more extensive. Different Spanish governments were also forced to pro-
vide additional aid to railway companies (particularly during the crises of  the 
62. Pereira (2016), pp. 258-264. Vieira (1988).
63. Telo (1991), pp. 86-87, 117-119 and 149-153.
64. The Royal Company also played this card, suggesting that if the government did not meet 
its demands it would convince the shareholders to sell their equity to foreign investors. AHU, item 
2452-1B, minutes 3 December 1908 and 27 March 1909. Portugal (1912a), pp. 25-27 e 29-31.
65. Pereira (2016), pp. 258-264. Vieira (1988).
66. The bondholders had little use for the line. However, they could take it and sell it to oth-
er companies with colonial interests in Angola. In Britain, the press considered this solution a cer-
tainty. RT, 63-7-2876 (18 February 1893), p. 236.
67. Vieira (1988). Kerr and Pereira (2012), p. 190.
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1860s, 1890s and 1910s) to prevent their failure and to pay the investors.68 
A similar situation occurred in France where the state established public-pri-
vate partnerships with sundry firms and later was called to help them on dif-
ferent occasions (for instance, the convention of  1859, renegotiated in 1863, 
1868, and 1875, or when the government decided to pay the interest on rail-
way bonds in 1883).69
Similarly to what happened in Spain and France (and previously in Por-
tugal as well), the strained relationship between state and private enterprise 
in the Ambaca process motivated a growing discomfort of Portuguese author-
ities with private enterprise in the railway sector. Since the late 1890s, many 
stressed the need for state control of  railways (both colonial and mainland) 
to put them at the service of  the public interest and the national economy. 
In the early 1900s this was more rhetorical than practical (take as an exam-
ple the case of  the Benguela railway, also in Angola, hired to a Scottish en-
trepreneur, Robert Williams, in 1902).70 However, it was the inception of  a 
stronger position towards the end of  public-private partnerships and a stur-
dier presence of  the state in the railway sector that took a clearer form after 
World War I. The Ambaca railway was a cause and a consequence of this new 
understanding.
To conclude, the Ambaca railway is another example of  a private invest-
ment at public risk,71 and how a “project failure and the concessionaires’ 
bankruptcy have resulted in the government having to assume heavy financial 
obligations, which have ultimately been absorbed by taxpayers and users”.72 
Indeed, the only winners in this process were the bondholders,73 who duly re-
ceived their annual instalments for 35 years in a row (and resumed their in-
come from 1933 onwards). It reinforces the assumption that in these cases, 
the companies become more dependent on the state rather than on the mar-
ket, which does not incentivize the concessionaires to build or to operate more 
efficiently, quite the contrary.74 
68. Cuéllar (2018), p. 557. Ortúñez (2009), p. 142.
69. Caron (1997-2005), vol. 1, pp. 235-242. Ortúñez (2014), p. 109.
70. Navarro (2018), p. 488-489.
71. Thorner (1950), pp. 168-182. This author analyses the guaranteed railways of British In-
dia to provide another good example of failed public-private partnerships.
72. Marques (2018), p. 213.
73. Guimarães (1983), p. 121.
74. Numa (2009), p. 120.
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Appendix
TABLE 3 ▪ Exchange rate (1 conto = £x)
Year Rate Year Rate Year Rate Year Rate
1891 205.4 1898 139.5 1905 208.5 1912 201.0
1892 174.3 1899 155.7 1906 218.2 1913 190.5
1893 178.4 1900 158.1 1907 215.1 1914 174.9
1894 172.6 1901 156.6 1908 192.0 1915 148.6
1895 175.5 1902 174.7 1909 192.6 1916 142.5
1896 170.7 1903 179.1 1910 204.2 1917 130.0
1897 152.0 1904 184.6 1911 204.5 1918 126.3
Source: See note 21.
TABLE 4 ▪ Evolution of the Royal Company’s debt (pounds and contos)
Year
Issued 
bonds
(1)
Capital raised 
(73% facial 
value)
Bonds 
redeemed 
(2)
Total debt (1) 
– (2)
Interest due (5%)
Pounds Contos
1887 1,351,480 986,580 1,200 1,350,280 67,514 303.81
1888 1,351,720 986,756 2,100 1,349,620 67,481 303.66
1889 1,452,100 1,060,033 3,100 1,449,000 72,450 326.02
1890 1,452,340 1,060,208 4,100 1,448,240 72,412 325.85
1891 1,452,460 1,060,296 5,100 1,447,360 72,368 352.29
1892 1,452,720 1,060,486 6,200 1,446,520 72,326 415.01
1893 1,528,260 1,115,630 7,400 1,520,860 76,043 426.14
1894 1,638,040 1,195,769 8,600 1,629,440 81,472 472.13
1895 1,747,680 1,275,806 9,800 1,737,880 86,894 495.21
1896 1,747,740 1,275,850 11,200 1,736,540 86,827 508.63
1897 1,747,760 1,275,865 12,600 1,735,160 86,758 570.61
1898 1,747,820 1,275,909 14,100 1,733,720 86,686 621.37
1899 1,890,000 1,379,700 15,700 1,874,300 93,715 601.74
1900 1,890,000 1,379,700 17,300 1,872,700 93,635 592.15
1901 1,890,000 1,379,700 19,000 1,871,000 93,550 597.22
1902 1,890,000 1,379,700 20,800 1,869,200 93,460 534.97
1903 1,890,000 1,379,700 22,700 1,867,300 93,365 521.16
(Continued on next page)
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Year
Issued 
bonds
(1)
Capital raised 
(73% facial 
value)
Bonds 
redeemed 
(2)
Total debt (1) 
– (2)
Interest due (5%)
Pounds Contos
1904 1,890,000 1,379,700 24,700 1,865,300 93,265 505.12
1905 1,890,000 1,379,700 26,800 1,863,200 93,160 446.89
1906 1,890,000 1,379,700 29,000 1,861,000 93,050 426.54
1907 1,890,000 1,379,700 31,300 1,858,700 92,935 431.96
1908 1,890,000 1,379,700 33,700 1,856,300 92,815 483.38
1909 1,890,000 1,379,700 36,300 1,853,700 92,685 481.22
1910 1,890,000 1,379,700 38,900 1,851,100 92,555 453.33
1911 1,890,000 1,379,700 41,700 1,848,300 92,415 451.91
1912 1,890,000 1,379,700 44,700 1,845,300 92,265 459.11
1913 1,890,000 1,379,700 47,800 1,842,200 92,110 483.39
1914 1,890,000 1,379,700 51,100 1,838,900 91,945 525.65
1915 1,890,000 1,379,700 54,500 1,835,500 91,775 617.55
1916 1,890,000 1,379,700 58,100 1,831,900 91,595 642.81
1917 1,890,000 1,379,700 61,900 1,828,100 91,405 703.09
1918 1,890,000 1,379,700 65,900 1,824,100 91,205 721.89
1919 1,923,000 1,403,790 70,000 1,853,000 92,650 778.07
1920 1,923,000 1,403,790 74,400 1,848,600 92,430 1,842.50
1921 1,923,000 1,403,790 79,000 1,844,000 92,200 3,696.30
1922 1,923,000 1,403,790 84,700 1,838,300 91,915 6,367.23
1923 1,923,000 1,403,790 90,000 1,833,000 91,650 10,058.31
1924 1,923,000 1,403,790 95,540 1,827,460 91,373 12,239.50
1925 1,923,000 1,403,790 101,280 1,821,720 91,086 8,870.32
1926 1,923,000 1,403,790 107,460 1,815,540 90,777 8,602.94
1927 1,923,000 1,403,790 113,900 1,809,100 90,455 8,570.70
Notes: Payment of annuities ceased in 1919. Values from this year onwards are merely indicative. In 1919, the com-
pany decided to issue more bonds, arguing that since the line to Ambaca was just 354 km long, debt service was 
below 1.199 contos/km.
Source: Converted to pounds from Royal Company Annual Reports. Annuities and its conversion to contos are my 
calculations.
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TABLE 5 ▪ Guarantee of yield and other subsidies granted by the state to the Royal 
Company (contos)
Year
Gross 
revenue
/km
(1)
Expenditure
/km
(2)
Guarantee 
of yield
/km
(3)
km in 
operation
(4)
Coverage of 
losses
[(2) – (1)] × (4)
Guarantee 
of yield
(3) × (4)*
State 
aid Total
1889 0.213 1.2 1.2 60 59.25  72.00 – 131.25
1890 0.251 1.2 1.2 100 94.91 119.99 – 214.90
1891 0.299 1.2 1.2 168 151.45 201.59 1,470.00 1,823.04
1892 0.364 1.2 1.2 209 174.67 250.79 1,189.43 1,614.89
1893 0.468 1.2 1.2 236 172.84 283.19 192.96 648.99
1894 0.516 1.2 1.2 270 184.71 323.98 230.15 738.84
1895 0.658 0.9 1.2 294 71.21 264.42 88.60 424.24
1896 0.620 0.9 1.2 305 85.38 274.48 85.50 445.36
1897 0.662 0.9 1.2 308 73.19 277.18 119.10 469.47
1898 0.660 0.9 1.2 309 74.16 278.08 143.93 496.17
1899 0.724 0.9 1.2 350 61.74 314.98 210.56 587.28
1900 0.826 0.9 1.2 364 27.04 327.58 227.01 581.63
1901 0.827 0.9 1.2 364 26.62 327.58 219.38 573.58
1902 0.822 0.9 1.2 364 28.46 327.58 213.39 569.43
1903 0.879 0.9 1.2 364 7.79 327.58 220.22 555.59
1904 0.924 0.9 1.2 364 0.00 327.58 217.68 545.26
1905 0.832 0.9 1.2 364 24.80 327.58 204.06 556.44
1906 0.859 0.9 1.2 364 14.82 327.58 199.63 542.02
1907 0.847 0.9 1.2 364 19.17 327.58 216.50 563.24
1908 0.824 0.9 1.2 364 27.84 327.58 200.78 556.20
1909 0.857 0.9 1.2 364 15.63 327.58 220.06 563.26
1910 1.240 0.9 1.2 364 0.00 327.58 169.36 496.94
1911 0.880 0.9 1.2 364 7.37 327.58 226.77 561.72
1912 0.914 0.9 1.2 364 – 327.58 239.76 567.33
1913 0.985 0.9 1.2 364 – 327.58 220.53 548.11
Notes: From 1895 onwards, 0.3 contos/km were deducted from the guarantee of yield; in the original sources the 
coverage of losses also includes the sums in the column ‘state aid’. Guarantee of yield is my calculation. 
Source: AHU, items 299-1H, 2756-1B. 
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■
The Ambaca railway in Angola: history of  a failed public-private partner-
ship (1885-1914 and briefly onwards)
abstRact 
In 1886, the Portuguese government signed a public-private partnership with a private 
company to build and operate a railway between Luanda and Ambaca in its overseas colony 
of  Angola. It was expected that the partnership would benefit both parties: it would provide 
Angola with a powerful tool of  economic development and political appropriation, and it 
would pay the private investment (stockholders and bondholders). However, the enterprise 
soon became a financial disaster with soaring construction costs and feeble operational reve-
nues, which forced the Portuguese state to intervene. In this paper, I will analyse the evolution 
of  the Ambaca public-private partnership from a quantitative perspective, examining the fig-
ures of  its financing, operation and state aid. I will add to the debate about the relationship 
between state and private initiatives, through public-private partnerships in the specific con-
text of  the scramble for Africa and New Imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.
keywoRds: Angola, railway, colonialism, public enterprise
Jel codes: F54, L32, L92, M21
■
El ferrocarril de Ambaca en Angola: historia de un consorcio público-priva-
do fallido (1885-1914 y brevemente, en adelante)
Resumen 
En 1886, el gobierno portugués estableció un consorcio público-privado con una empresa 
privada para construir y operar un ferrocarril entre Luanda y Ambaca en su colonia ultrama-
rina de Angola. Se esperaba que la asociación beneficiara a ambas partes: proporcionaría a An-
gola una poderosa herramienta de desarrollo económico y apropiación política y pagaría la in-
versión privada (accionistas y tenedores de bonos). Sin embargo, pronto la empresa se convirtió 
en un desastre financiero con altos costos de construcción e ingresos operacionales débiles, lo 
que obligó al Estado portugués a intervenir. En este documento, analizaré la evolución del con-
sorcio público-privado de Ambaca desde una perspectiva cuantitativa, examinando las cifras 
de su financiamiento, operación y ayuda estatal. Me sumaré al debate sobre la relación entre 
el Estado y la iniciativa privada, a través de asociaciones público-privadas en el contexto espe-
cífico del «scramble for Africa» y del Nuevo Imperialismo de finales del siglo xix y principios 
del xx.
PalabRas clave: Angola, ferrocarril, colonialismo, empresa pública
códiGos Jel: F54, L32, L92, M21
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